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Simplicity v. Reality in the Workplace:
Balancing the Aims of
Vance v. Ball State University and
the Fair Employment Protection Act
Elizabeth Lee*
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer can be held liable for
harassment or discrimination by a supervisor. In 2013, in Vance v. Ball State University,
the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of supervisor, limiting victims’ ability to prevail
on vicarious liability claims. In response, Congress proposed the Fair Employment
Protection Act (“FEPA”), which sought a return to the broader, pre-Vance definition of
supervisor. While Congress has been successful in overriding decisions inconsistent with
Title VII’s aims in other contexts, FEPA did not gain enough momentum and eventually
failed. As a result, the Vance decision stands, posing an obstacle to many employees whose
harassers were not supervisors, but still controlled nearly every aspect of their daily work.
Arguing that neither the pre- nor the post-Vance definition of supervisor fully recognizes
workplace realities, this Note proposes a tiered liability structure based on the actual
workplace dynamic between harasser and victim. This broader structure reaches
harassment by those with the apparent authority to take tangible employment actions. This
additional category is important because, if an employee is not aware of a superior’s
authority or has reason to believe that her harasser can fire or demote her, it does not matter
whether the harasser actually has the authority to do so. However, if employers have
exercised reasonable care in preventing or correcting harassment, this structure provides for
an affirmative defense against vicarious liability. Further, the structure applies a negligence
standard to harassment by coworkers or those who are clearly day-to-day supervisors.
As the workplace continues to take on new forms, this structure would allow employers to
minimize liability through clear employee structuring and proper training; victims to seek
redress through the category that most aptly reflects their harassers’ authority over them;
and courts to more accurately evaluate supervisory status and liability. In effect, this
structure can improve efficiency and accuracy throughout the litigation process.
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Notes
Editor, Hastings Law Journal; B.A., 2012, University of San Diego. My sincerest gratitude to Professor
Michelle Travis of the University of San Francisco for her perspective and support throughout this
experience and for helping me to articulate my vision for this Note. I would also like to thank Hastings
Law Journal Notes editors, Mohneet Dhaliwal, Regina Durr, and Traci Aoki, and the entire
Production Department for their outstanding work. It has been a great privilege to work alongside all
of you. Lastly, thank you to my loving parents, Patrick and Nancy Lee, for their unwavering
confidence in me. It is because of you, and the values you have instilled in me, that I have reached this
point in my life and career.
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Introduction
In the midst of the countless complexities and nuances governing
today’s legal system, meritorious claims may nevertheless succeed or fail
on the interpretation of a single word. Holding substantial interpretive
power, courts have the authority and the opportunity to dictate the
future path of the statute at hand. Through the practice of statutory
interpretation, courts can choose to either honor or set aside the
underlying aims of the legislation in question. The way in which many
courts have interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
1
VII”) exemplifies this judicial discretion.
Under Title VII, it is an “unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2013).
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
2
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” However,
Title VII’s strength is diminished when courts interpret it in a manner
that limits protection for employees. By displacing the aims of Title VII,
courts not only inhibit plaintiffs’ opportunities for redress, but also
dismiss Congress’ efforts to address the ever-present problems of
workplace discrimination and harassment. With the “realm of the
3
constantly changing, courts and Congress must
workplace”
communicate to ensure that employers and the judicial system effectuate
Title VII in the modern workplace.
Where the outcome of a case can turn on the definition of a single
word, courts should carefully consider the impact of, and reaction to, its
impending decision, including a possible response from Congress. If
Congress chooses to override a judicial interpretation, it should proceed
carefully and thoughtfully, upholding the aims of Title VII without
rejecting the courts’ justification for a narrow interpretation out-of-hand.
Recently, one such conflict between the judicial and legislative
branches arose over the definition of “supervisor,” significantly impacting
employees’ ability to bring claims under Title VII. In Vance v. Ball State
University, the success of Maetta Vance’s claim for harassment in the
workplace hinged on the courts’ interpretation of the term supervisor in
4
the context of vicarious liability under Title VII. In Vance, the Supreme
Court held that vicarious liability would only extend to employers who had
“empowered th[e harassing] employee to take tangible employment
actions against the victim, that is, to effect a ‘significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
5
significant change in benefits.’”
To arrive at this narrow interpretation, the Court rejected the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) broad definition of a
supervisor as either “(1) an individual authorized ‘to undertake or
recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee,’
including ‘hiring, firing, promoting, demoting, and reassigning the
employee’; [sic] or (2) an individual authorized ‘to direct the employee’s
6
daily work activities.’” With the latter EEOC definition now removed from
the analysis, the Court adhered to the pro-employer side of a circuit split,
creating a significant roadblock for employees who are harassed by a

2. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
3. Martha Chamallas, Lecture, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 Val. U. L.
Rev. 133, 162–63 (2013).
4. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013).
5. Id. at 2443 (citation omitted).
6. Id. at 2455 (citation omitted).

Lee-67.6.docx (Do Not Delete)

1772

9/8/2016 4:27 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1769

7

superior without this narrow range of authority. As a result, the Court’s
definition of supervisor redrew the line between vicarious and negligencebased liability in determining employer liability for harassment in the
workplace under Title VII. Soon thereafter, members of Congress drafted
the Fair Employment Protection Act (“FEPA”) in direct response to the
8
Vance decision. The legislation proposed a return to the EEOC’s
broader definition of supervisor, but ultimately died in Congress, leaving
a broad range of employees unable to seek redress under the theory of
9
vicarious liability for harassment in the workplace.
This Note proposes a response to the Court’s holding in Vance that
would address the practical and public policy concerns voiced by both
pro-employee and pro-employer advocates. Part I provides an overview
of the Vance decision and the proposed FEPA legislation. Part II
describes the pattern of congressional overrides in Title VII’s history,
which provides context for the discussion of the Vance decision and
FEPA. Part III discusses why FEPA would not have been successful in
accomplishing Congress’ goals due to likely resistance from courts and
employers. Part IV highlights the successes and failures of both the
Vance decision and FEPA, suggesting ways in which a middle ground
approach could address the concerns of the Court and Congress
regarding modern-day business, judicial concerns, and the harsh realities
that victims of harassment face. Finally, Part V proposes a solution in the
form of a tiered structure of liability based on the designation of the
harasser in one of four categories. The underlying purpose of this
proposal is to better facilitate courts’ and employers’ acceptance and
implementation of a congressional override as it applies to employer
liability under Title VII.
I. Background
Under Title VII, the question of whether the harasser was or was
not her victim’s supervisor directly impacts the victim’s ability to hold
her employer vicariously liable for the harm suffered. The Vance Court
limited the scope of the supervisory authority for these purposes, and the

7. Catherine L. Fisk, Special Issue on Circuit Splits, Supervisors in A World of Flat Hierarchies,
64 Hastings L.J. 1403, 1406 (2013) (“The circuits have clearly split on who constitutes a supervisor
under Title VII, with the Seventh and Eighth Circuits having taken a relatively extreme position that
only those who have the actual power to hire, fire, demote, transfer, and discipline workers are
supervisors, and other circuits having accepted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(‘EEOC’) position that a Title VII supervisor includes one who has the authority to direct another
employee’s daily activities, workload, or tasks.”).
8. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(b) (2d Sess. 2014).
9. See H.R. 4227 (113th Cong.): Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, GovTrack, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr4227 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see also S. 2133 (113th Cong.): Fair
Employment Protection Act of 2014, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2133 (last visited
Aug. 5, 2016).
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proponents of FEPA were unsuccessful in achieving a return to a
broader definition. Examining the decision and the legislation more
closely will shed light on where the judicial and legislative branches
differed in their views of Title VII.
A. VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY
Maetta Vance (“Vance”), an African-American woman employed
at Ball State University (“the University”) as a catering assistant, alleged
that Saundra Davis (“Davis”), a University catering specialist, had
harassed her by directing racial slurs and threats towards her and
engaging in behavior that included “glaring at her, slamming pots and
10
pans around her, and intimidating her.” After Vance complained to
management, who instructed the two employees to “respect” one
another, the harassment worsened as the taunting, racial slurs, and
11
threats continued. Ultimately proceeding to litigation, Vance alleged
that the University was vicariously liable for Davis’ “creation of a racially
12
hostile work environment” because she was Vance’s supervisor. The
parties agreed that Davis could not take “tangible employment actions,”
13
like hiring or firing, against Vance. Unfortunately, this characterization
of Davis’ authority ultimately led to the defeat of Vance’s claim when the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that for a vicarious liability action to
stand, the harasser must have the authority to take “tangible
14
employment action.” Affirming the Seventh Circuit and district court,
the Court held that the University was not liable for Davis’ actions
because Davis was not Vance’s supervisor and Vance could not
15
otherwise prove the University’s negligence.
This trajectory from serious and repeated workplace harassment by
an alleged supervisor, to an unfavorable outcome for the victim is not
unique to Vance. As discussed in further detail below, many employees
have alleged meritorious claims of verbal, physical, and sexual harm,
only to have the success of their vicarious liability cases turn on the
16
court’s opinion of whether the harasser constituted a supervisor. For
10. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., No. 1:06-cv-1452-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL
4247836 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 10, 2008); Brief for Petitioner at 6, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434
(2013) (No. 11-556).
11. Brief for the Petitioner at 7, 9, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (No. 11-556).
12. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440 (citation omitted).
13. Id. (“The [district] court explained that BSU could not be held vicariously liable for Davis’
alleged racial harassment because Davis could not “‘hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline’”
Vance and, as a result, was not Vance’s supervisor under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of that
concept.” (citation omitted)).
14. See id. and text accompanying note 13.
15. Id. (“The [Seventh Circuit] concluded that Davis was not Vance’s supervisor and thus that Vance
could not recover from BSU unless she could prove negligence. Finding that BSU was not negligent with
respect to Davis’ conduct, the court affirmed.” (citation omitted)).
16. See infra Parts IV.C, D, V.B.
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those who never pursue reporting or litigating workplace harassment for
fear of retaliatory action or financial instability, the Vance standard
makes the decision to pursue these avenues all the more risky.
B. The Fair Employment Protection Act
Reacting to the Court’s decision in Vance, members of Congress
introduced FEPA, calling for a return to the EEOC’s broad two-part
definition of supervisor, which extends vicarious liability to actions by
supervisors who can pursue tangible employment actions and supervisors
17
who can direct day-to-day activities. Under the EEOC’s broader
definition of supervisor, vicarious liability arises from harassment by “(1)
an individual with the authority to undertake or recommend tangible
employment actions affecting the victim of the harassment; or (2) an
18
individual with the authority to direct the victim’s daily work activities.”
Several concerns motivated this reaction from both chambers of
19
Congress. Senator Tammy Baldwin noted, “workplace harassment
remains an unacceptable reality that threatens the economic security of far
20
too many people, particularly women.” Representative George Miller
took issue with the Vance decision because it “made it harder for victims of
21
unlawful and insidious harassment to hold their employers accountable.”
In further criticism, Representative Rosa DeLauro expressed that the
decision “reinforced the Roberts Court’s reputation as the most anti22
worker Supreme Court[] in our nation’s history.” Further concern arises
because employers can now strategically utilize this narrow approach to
their benefit and their employees’ detriment. Nancy Zirkin, Executive
Vice President of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human
Rights, affirmed this concern, explaining that “[b]y redefining
‘supervisor’ to exclude the managers that interact with workers on a dayto-day basis, the Supreme Court has given corporations and middle
management a free pass to skirt liability for abusing employees and
23
lowered penalties for when they’re found guilty.” Overall, the Court’s
24
narrow definition undermined the protections afforded in earlier cases and
“ignore[d] the reality that employees with the authority to control their

17. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(b) (2d Sess. 2014).
18. Id.
19. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Harkin, Baldwin,
Miller, DeLauro Introduce Bill to Fight Workplace Harassment: “Fair Employment Protection Act”
Restores Workplace Protections (Mar. 13, 2014).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (exemplifying how the narrow definition of “supervisor” undermines
workplace protections).
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subordinates’ daily work . . . are aided by that authority in perpetuating a
25
discriminatory work environment.”
The proponents of FEPA advocated for a return to the EEOC
definition due to concern with the Vance decision’s negative impact on
victims’ ability to seek redress for workplace harassment suffered.
26
Despite their intention to uphold the spirit of Title VII, Congress
27
ultimately did not enact FEPA, which essentially reverted to the
EEOC’s previous interpretation, and further failed to contemplate any of
the rationales, as expressed in Vance, for narrowing the definition of
supervisor. For example, the Vance majority had discussed certain
aspects of the modern workplace (such as less hierarchical employee
structures and increasingly shared responsibilities) and of the judicial
system (such as the likelihood of jury confusion when complex jury
instructions are used) as modern-day rationales for its decision.
However, the FEPA drafters ignored these, and other valid
28
considerations. In doing so, Congress chose an ineffective course of
action. Specifically, when employers’ and courts’ legitimate concerns are
29
left unaddressed, Congress runs the risk that its proposed policies might
not be strong enough to withstand resistance from courts and employers
that prefer the simplicity of Vance’s singular definition of supervisor.
Within the realm of Title VII, the Court and Congress have engaged
in a pendulum-like dialogue. Generally, this back-and-forth begins when
the Court arrives at a narrow interpretation of the law and, in reaction,
Congress quickly responds with sweeping legislation that fails to
incorporate practical considerations. Next, holding steadfast to less
progressive interpretations of Title VII, courts and employers refuse to
accept the congressional response in full. As discussed in Part III of this
Note, Congress’ efforts are often challenged because employers refuse to
revise their practices to reflect pro-employee changes, and courts
continue to apply precedent as they choose, even if doing so conflicts
with the new legislation. Drafted less than one year after the Vance
decision, FEPA is an example of Congress’ pattern of reverting to a
previous interpretation under the law, and essentially ignoring the
Supreme Court’s holding.
This repeated interaction between the branches and other actors
suggests that there may be an unrealized opportunity for Congress to
25. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(11), (14) (2d Sess.
2014). This notion that supervisory authority aids employees who harass others partially lays the
groundwork for the proposed second category discussed in Part V.B.
26. See U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin, The Fair Employment Protection Act: When Our Workers
Have the Opportunity to Success, Am. Succeeds, https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
FairEmploymentProtectionActBckrnd.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
27. See all sources cited supra note 9.
28. See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (discussing these realities).
29. See, e.g., H.R. 4227 (discussing the need to protect low-wage workers).
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respond thoughtfully to the Court’s decisions in times of disagreement,
so that it can establish real-world solutions that courts and employers will
not subsequently resist. The fact that FEPA never became a reality
suggests that there was a missed opportunity to modernize the
understanding of vicarious liability under Title VII in a way that is
agreeable to employees, employers, and their respective advocates, alike.
II. A Repeating Pattern Sought to Be Repeated Again
Central to this dialogue is Title VII, which deems it an “unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
30
sex, or national origin.” As interpreted, Title VII has been held, more
specifically, to prohibit discrimination in employment decisions with direct
economic consequences; the creation of a hostile work environment; and
31
discriminatory acts carried out by employers’ agents. The Court took a
step towards de-privatizing harassment and placing it “squarely within the
32
realm of the workplace” when it recognized for the first time that a
harasser’s creation of a hostile environment can affect the victim as well as
33
other coworkers. The Vance decision, however, indicates that the Court
is not always willing to de-privatize harassment to the fullest extent
necessary to protect victims. Congress’ response in FEPA further
suggests that the dialogue over the proper definition of supervisor has
not yet ended.
Regarding this dialogue between the judicial and legislative
branches, Congress has repeatedly overridden the Court’s decisions,
particularly in the context of Title VII. A congressional override has
been defined as legislation that:
(1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory interpretation decision,
just as a subsequent Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent; (2)
modifies the result of a decision in some material way, such that the same
case would have been decided differently; or (3) modifies the
consequences of the decision, such that the same case would have been
decided in the same way but subsequent cases would be decided
34
differently.

Two associated studies have examined these overrides, identifying
six common factors among the underlying, and ultimately overridden,

30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2013).
31. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440–41; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2013).
32. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 162–63.
33. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
34. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale
L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991).
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35

Supreme Court decisions. Statistically, the factors most commonly
correlated with overrides of the Court’s statutory interpretation include:
(1) close division (plurality or 5- or 6-Justice majority) among the Justices
when deciding the case; (2) judicial rejection of the interpretation offered
by a federal agency and usually defended by the Solicitor General; (3)
judicial narrowing of federal regulation, except in tax and intellectual
property cases, where regulation-friendly interpretations are often
overridden; (4) reliance on plain meaning of statutory texts, especially
when such reliance depends critically on whole act and whole code
arguments or flies in the face of strong legislative history; and (5)
invitations for Congress to override, issued by majority, concurring, or
36
even dissenting Justices.

Further analysis of the most highly publicized overrides has
demonstrated that there is a subset of “restorative” overrides through
which Congress seeks to “restore” its interpretation of statutory lawan
interpretation that is often also shared by the implementing agency but
37
rejected by the Court. This repeating pattern of restorative overrides is
particularly prevalent at the crossroads of antidiscrimination law and
38
employment law. For example, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
39
40
1978 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 are two prominent
congressional efforts in response to Supreme Court decisions that were
criticized for curtailing minorities’ and women’s rights under Title VII by
41
way of narrow interpretation. Similarly, FEPA set out to override
Vance and restore the EEOC’s pro-employee interpretation of
supervisor. Drawing this parallel, Representative DeLauro noted that, in
Vance, a slim five-four majority once again “struck at the heart of
longstanding civil rights laws,” “[j]ust as [it] did with Lilly Ledbetter’s
42
case.”
There are several key examples in Title VII’s history that best
illustrate the dynamics of this override system. For example, the Court’s
43
decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, which interpreted Title VII
to allow pregnancy-based employment discrimination, prompted a
44
restorative overridethe Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. The
General Electric Co. decision reflected the factors common in overridden
45
decisions including: a six-Justice ideologically conservative majority;
35. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1420 (2014).
36. Id. at 1321.
37. Id. at 1319.
38. Id. at 1359.
39. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
40. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
41. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1381.
42. U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, supra note 19.
43. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
44. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 34, at 352.
45. Id. at 353.
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rejection of the EEOC’s interpretation of sex discrimination under Title
46
47
VII; and reliance on the plain meaning of statutory text and
48
constitutional precedent. In response, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978 aimed to restore women’s rights by declaring pregnancy49
based discrimination unlawful.
More recently, the Court rejected the EEOC’s statutory
50
interpretation in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., prompting
51
Congress to respond with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. The
day the Court handed down the Ledbetter decision, “[r]ed flags” indicative
of an override “were flying all around” including: a five to four division
among the Justices; rejection of a position long-held by the EEOC;
significant narrowing of a regulatory scheme; adherence to a “plain
meaning and whole code approach that denigrated legislative history
arguments;” and a “plea for an override from the four dissenting
52
Justices.” In her Ledbetter dissent, Justice Ginsburg referred to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, stating “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court . . . to
53
correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.” Doing just that, the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 sought to restore women’s right to
equal pay. The Act “clarif[ied] that a discriminatory compensation decision
or other practice that is unlawful under [Title VII and related Acts] occurs
each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory
54
compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes,”
increasing victims’ opportunities to bring claims for discriminatory
compensation.
The five “flags” indicative of an impending override were present in
55
Vance: a five-Justice majority; rejection of the EEOC’s “nebulous”
46. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 142–43 (“The EEOC guideline in question does not fare well under
these standards. It is not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, since it was first promulgated eight
years after the enactment of that Title. More importantly, the 1972 guideline flatly contradicts the position
which the agency had enunciated at an earlier date, closer to the enactment of the governing statute. . . .
There are also persuasive indications that the more recent EEOC guideline sharply conflicts with other
indicia of the proper interpretation of the sex-discrimination provisions of Title VII.”).
47. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 34, at 388 (“The Court rested its decision primarily upon a
constitutional precedent which held that depriving women of pregnancy benefits was not gender-based
”
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. (citation omitted)).
48. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 145 (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ of course, was well known at
the time of the enactment of Title VII, having been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment for
nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history of judicial construction. When Congress makes it
unlawful for an employer to ‘discriminate [] because of [] sex [],’ without further explanation of its
meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant something different from what the concept of
discrimination has traditionally meant[.]” (citations omitted)).
49. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1335.
50. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
51. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1449.
52. Id. at 1443.
53. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C.).
55. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2438 (2013).
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definition of supervisor; narrowing of “supervisor” to exclude
57
employees who control coworkers’ day-to-day activities; reliance on
58
Title VII’s nonuse of “supervisor;” and an invitation from Justice
Ginsburg to override“[t]he ball is once again in Congress’ court to
correct the error into which this Court has fallen, and to restore the
robust protections against workplace harassment the Court weakens
59
today.” With the Vance opinion “furiously waving all five red flags,”
members of Congress attempted to repeat the override pattern with
60
FEPA in 2014.
III. The Fair Employment Protection Act Would Not Have Been the
Next Successful Congressional Override
Congressional overrides are signs of congressional health because
these efforts are significant opportunities to update public policy to
61
reflect current norms. However, if congressional overrides are devised
and implemented as knee-jerk reactions to the Court’s decisions, the goal
of changing public policy cannot be as readily accomplished. Instead,
Congress should seize these opportunities fully by considering current
workplace realities, judicial efficiency, and the likelihood of
implementation by the courts and employers. Recognizing the concerns
on both sides, Congress can effectively move public policy forward,
clarify the law, and mitigate the chance that courts and employers will
62
undermine these overrides.
63
The Court’s decision in Ledbetter illustrates the unfortunate reality
that many restorative overrides do not accomplish Congress’ intended
64
goals for new legislation. The scenario, referred to as the “Lilly
Ledbetter problem,” arises when the Court interprets an override as
leaving it with the option to apply an overridden holding in situations not
65
explicitly covered by the language of the new statute. For example, in
Ledbetter, the Court decided that those claiming unequal pay under Title
VII must file their claims within 180 or 300 days after the first paycheck
56. Id. at 2443.
57. Id. at 2455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court today strikes from the supervisory category
employees who control the day-to-day schedules and assignments of others, confining the category to
those formally empowered to take tangible employment actions.”).
58. Id. at 2446 (“[P]etitioner is misguided in suggesting that we should approach the question
presented here as if ‘supervisor’ were a statutory term. ‘Supervisor’ is not a term used by Congress in
Title VII. Rather, the term was adopted by this Court in Ellerth and Faragher as a label for the class of
employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious employer liability.”).
59. Id. at 2466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1413.
61. Id. at 1322, 1414.
62. Id. at 1443.
63. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 618.
64. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1443.
65. Id.
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showing the unequal paya difficult burden to bear given that many
claimants would not have the necessary access to their male coworkers’
66
pay information to prove the discrepancy. In reaching this decision, the
67
Court relied on two authorities, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.
68
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. First, the Court looked to Lorance
because it too had imposed a burdensome time limit of 180 or 300 days
on female employees’ complaints about allegedly discriminatory
69
seniority rules. Second, the Court looked to the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which amended Title VII to provide a more employee-friendly
70
time limit for seniority claims only. Using these two authorities, the
Ledbetter Court opined that the permissive limitation under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 did not apply to all sex or race discrimination claims
71
(such as sex-based unequal pay), but only to seniority claims.
Along with the Ledbetter Court, other courts have similarly resisted
72
restorative overrides and relied instead upon overridden decisions.
Lower courts continue to cite the overridden Lorance decision with
73
regard to statutes of limitations. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
continues to apply overridden decisions involving the Age Discrimination
74
75
in Employment Act (“ADEA”). For example, in Gross v. FBL
76
Financial Services, Inc., the Court interpreted the ADEA “less liberally”
77
than Title VII, and relied on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a decision
78
explicitly overridden by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Again, in Smith v.
79
City of Jackson, the Court deliberately applied the overridden Wards
80
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio decision over the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on
the grounds that “[w]hile the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the
coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the

66. Id. at 1442.
67. Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
68. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1442.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1443.
73. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of
Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 546 (2009); see, e.g., Lettis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 39 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 907, without acknowledging the 1991
amendments, for the proposition that in determining when a statute of limitations begins to run, “the
proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of
the acts became most painful”).
74. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621–24 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)).
75. Widiss, supra note 73, at 544.
76. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
77. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 228.
78. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1443 n.445.
79. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss. 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
80. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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subject of age discrimination. Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation
81
of Title VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.” The
lesson to be learned through these examples is that Congress must
recognize the ways in which courts respond to overrides and incorporate
82
those realities into drafting new legislation.
In relation to Vance and FEPA, learning from courts’ conscious
rejection of overrides is particularly important for two reasons. First, it is
important because this problem arises most prominently in the context of
workplace discrimination controversies that polarize the Court and
83
Congress. Second, there is a concern that courts will continue to apply
Vance despite the protections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 where “[t]he
boldness of the five-Justice majority in [Vance] . . . suggests that the sting
of the 1991 CRA rebuke has worn off and that the majority does not fear a
84
congressional response.” Both suggest that Congress might be more
successful if it chooses to respond carefully, not hastily.
A further issue is that the Court and Congress often diverge in their
consideration of business realities. While business interests often succeed
before the Court, the override process does not typically favor pro85
employer interests. Here, Congress’ reversion to the pro-employee, preVance definition of supervisor without much regard for the Court’s
reasoning for a more narrow definition is an example of the branches’
split on the issue of business interests. With these competing interests, it
would not be surprising if, following a new statutory override like FEPA,
courts and employers would be resistant to these non-business-friendly,
liability-expanding changes.
IV. The Need for a Non-Reactionary Override
To address the concerns presented in both Vance and FEPA, it is
important that any override of the Vance decision be thoughtful, nonreactionary, and balanced. If Congress were to adopt such an approach
when responding to the Court’s narrow decisions, the repeated
pendulum-like swing from narrow Court decisions to broad, policydriven legislation, and back to judicial and employer resistance, could
slow down, opening the door to sustainable progress.
Evaluating the majority’s narrow interpretation of supervisor in
Vance, the call for a response from Congress is justified because the
decision is inconsistent with both the underlying intent and remedial

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Widiss, supra note 73, at 547 n.162 (citation omitted).
Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 35, at 1322–23.
See id. at 1443.
Id. at 1476.
Id. at 1380.
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86

aims of Title VII. Narrowing the class of supervisors whose actions can
result in vicarious liability for the employer, Vance left fewer avenues
through which employers could be held vicariously liable for workplace
harassment, reducing employers’ incentives to prevent discrimination
87
and implement change in the workplace.
With these long-standing principles of Title VII in mind, FEPA
must also be evaluated in light of whether it could have actually carried
out those aims in practice. Factors discussed thus far in this Note that
would have cast doubt on FEPA’s long-term effectiveness include:
widespread liability being too unpredictable for courts; business interests
being unaccounted for; and in pushing the pendulum as far as it can go,
Congress often failing to address the practical concerns of enforcing new
legislation. Even with these valid concerns, victims of workplace
harassment must endure harsh realities that are more than troubling
enough to shock the conscience into realizing that more needs to be done
to protect lower-level employees from retaliation, and to ensure their
access to redress.
A. Business and Workplace Realities
With the level of an employer’s liability resting so heavily on the job
titles and descriptions of its employees, it is important that legislation
accurately reflect the modern-day workplace and consider the interests
of both employers and employees. Modern workplace trends that should
be considered include: a less “hierarchical management structure” and
“overlapping authority [among employees] with respect to the assignment
of work tasks,” such that “[m]embers of a team may each have the
responsibility for taking the lead with respect to a particular aspect of the
work and thus may have the responsibility to direct each other in that area
88
of responsibility.” Another reality is the lack of presence of “clearly
supervisory employees . . . on the premises at all times . . . [such that] there
89
will be no one around who is clearly a supervisor.”
The Vance majority responded to these realities in a manner that
predominately benefitted employers. One such benefit under Vance is
improved clarity as a result of a singular definition of supervisor.
Employers are inclined to favor this narrower interpretation because it
reduces the range of employees who may constitute supervisors, and
90
thereby reduces the risk of vicarious liability. Modern organizations are
further drawn towards a more narrow definition of supervisor where
86. Lakisha A. Davis, Who’s the Boss? A Distinction Without a Difference, 19 Barry L. Rev. 155,
172 (2013).
87. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 246465 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2452.
89. Fisk, supra note 7, at 1404.
90. Id. at 1415.
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employees have overlapping responsibilities and levels of authority are
91
blurry. Where a traditional hierarchical management structure does not
apply or exist, and many employees have the power to assign tasks to one
another, limiting the designation of supervisor to those who can take or
suggest “tangible employment actions” allows for some added clarity in
92
determining vicarious liability.
This flattening of hierarchical employee structures, however, is not
without consequences with regard to establishing a clear chain of
command. Under these flatter structures, lower-level supervisors are taking
on increasingly managerial roles and making decisions that affect
employees’ everyday work including: the maintenance of safety, cleanliness,
and equipment; employee training and scheduling; and facilitating “human
relations” counseling, union-management relations, and other external
93
relations. Though team-based structures typically engender notions of a
collaborative and communicative work environment, these structures are
arguably driving courts’ determinations that harassers are mere coworkers,
not supervisors. Furthermore, if employees were better informed of their
supervisors’ authority over them, victims of workplace harassment would
likely feel more secure in their decisions to report harassment, knowing,
for example, that their harasser is not actually authorized to take
substantial retaliatory action against them.
With the majority’s focus largely on employers’ interests, Vance fell
short of upholding the aims of Title VII, especially in light of the
decreasing presence of clear supervisory authority and the increasing
94
presence of lower-level supervisors. For example, Justice Ginsburg
found the modern-day, less hierarchical structure to be troubling for
victims who perceive their harassers to have supervisory authority over
them. She explained, “the definition of a supervisor that we now adopt is
out of touch with the realities of the workplace, where individuals with
the power to assign daily tasks are often regarded by other employees as
95
supervisors.” Under this new standard, an employee who has endured
harassment at the hands of someone whom he or she perceives to possess
supervisory authority will be deprived of the greatest form of redress if
the harasser did not possess “tangible employment action” authority.
Instead, in order to prevail, a plaintiff harassed by an individual outside

91. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452.
92. Id.
93. Fatima Goss Graves et al., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Reality Check: Seventeen Million
Reasons Low-Wage Workers Need Strong Protections from Harassment 5 (2014) (citations omitted).
94. Across the following fields: transportation; farming, forestry, and fishing; sales; personal care;
cleaning and maintenance; and food preparation and services, for every 100 low-wage workers there
are approximately eighteen lower-level supervisors and merely four managers. Id. at 9.
95. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452.
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the scope of this narrow definition is forced to prove the company’s
96
negligence in preventing or stopping the harassment.
This new standard is troubling because these distinctions in
authority do not lessen the detrimental impact of the harassment on the
victim. Drawing the line for vicarious liability at a harasser’s ability to
take tangible employment actions is problematic for victims because in
the “all-too-plain” reality of the workplace, “[a] supervisor with
authority to control subordinates’ daily work is no less aided in his
harassment than is a supervisor with authority to fire, demote, or
97
transfer.” An abuse of power capable of deterring resistance or
reporting can arise from any level of vested power to control another’s
workplace activities, and is not limited to the authority possessed by the
98
Vance category of supervisor. This reality highlights the importance of
the “apparent authority” supervisor discussed in Part V.B.
FEPA notably called attention to these concerns with the Vance
decision as they affect vulnerable employee populations:
Individuals who direct the daily work activities of employees but do not
have the authority to take tangible employment actions against those
employees are common in the workplace in the United States, particularly
in industries that employ low-wage workers. Workers in industries
including retail, restaurant, health care, housekeeping, and personal care,
which may pay low wages and employ a large numbers of female workers,
are particularly vulnerable to harassment by individuals who have the
power to direct day-to-day work activities but lack the power to take
99
tangible employment actions.

Though Vance clearly has had an impact across industries, FEPA
failed to balance these concerns with those important to the Vance
majority. For example, the drafters did not provide any guidance as to
how employers could implement policies and train employees in light of
this broader liability, but without being overcome by the risk of
litigation. FEPA also failed to address modern-day, “flattened”
employee structures, which often blur the lines between supervisor and
subordinate. Where the two branches refuse to acknowledge one
another’s concerns, the pendulum swings on.
B. Judicial Realities
When interpreting Title VII, challenging questions should be
resolved in a manner that is workable and does not overburden those
who must implement the law. Actors likely to be overburdened in this
area of law include courts, juries, employers, employees, and human
resource professionals.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Fisk, supra note 7, at 1415.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(15) (2d Sess. 2014).
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Acknowledging these concerns, the Vance majority explained that
its interpretation of supervisor is favorable because it can be “readily
100
applied.” Justice Alito explained that prior to litigation, parties would
be able to better determine the alleged harasser’s statussupervisor or
coworkerduring discovery, assess the strength of the claim, and
101
consider options for resolution. Further, the single definition of
supervisor will improve efficiency in the pre-litigation stage because the
determination of the alleged harasser’s status as a mere coworker, rather
102
than a supervisor, will allow for earlier disposal of those cases. When
the alleged harasser’s supervisory status is determined as a matter of law,
103
parties will be able to focus their efforts on the applicable framework.
If the harasser is deemed a supervisor, then the defendant will have the
104
burden of proving an affirmative defense. In comparison, if the
harasser is deemed a coworker, then the plaintiff will have the difficult
105
burden of proving employer negligence.
During litigation, this singular category of supervisors would allow for
more straightforward factfinding, jury instructions, and analysis. For
example, even if the question of supervisor versus coworker cannot be
determined before trial because there is a genuine dispute about the
harasser’s authority, the question can be more readily resolved based on
106
further analysis of any authority to take “tangible employment actions.”
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with this opinion, and
during the oral argument in Vance, they praised the advantages of such a
simple, narrow rule, including improved efficiency where courts would no
longer have to sift through the facts in “countless cases” to determine
107
supervisory status. With regard to juries, there is a persistent concern
that “unnecessarily complicated instructions complicate a jury’s job in
108
employment discrimination cases.” To resolve this complication, “more
straightforward instructions [like Vance’s singular definition of supervisor]
109
‘provid[e] the jury with clearer guidance of their mission.’”
Despite these practical advantages, Vance falls short of preserving
the aims of Title VII. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent,
establishing such a simple approach can detract from other goals of Title
110
VII and the judicial system. She explained that the Court, as it did in

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2438.
Id.
Davis, supra note 86, at 167.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2450.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2448.
Fisk, supra note 7, at 1418 (citation omitted).
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2451 n.13.
Id.
Id. at 2462.
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Ledbetter, had once again sacrificed the protection against workplace
discrimination sought by Congress in Title VII for the sake of “simplicity
111
and administrability.” Challenging the majority’s resistance to factfinding, Justice Ginsburg noted that its focus on creating a simple rule for
instant application was in conflict with the Court’s usual consideration of
112
the specific facts in Title VII cases. Comparing the two primary
questions in this line of cases(1) whether the harassment or retaliation
occurred, and (2) whether the alleged harasser is a supervisor or a
coworker. Justice Ginsburg explained that both are subject to the same
level of factual inquiry into the “constellation of surrounding
113
circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”
Justice Ginsburg also criticized the majority’s narrow gateway into
vicarious liability for its burdensome impact on victims’ ability and
114
willingness to sue. In the case of victims who have not been harassed by
an individual with such explicit “tangible employment action” authority,
their only means for redress will be proving employer negligence in
115
With this “steeper
failing to prevent or stop the harassment.
substantive and procedural hill to climb,” Justice Ginsburg is concerned
that victims will see filing a harassment claim as a “hazardous
116
endeavor.” There is also the possibility that this narrow interpretation
will reduce settlement amounts for victims because employers will not be
as inclined to settle and employees will be more wary of pursuing trial for
117
fear that their cases may be dismissed. While the drafters of FEPA
shared Justice Ginsburg’s concerns, they did not give appropriate
consideration to the efficiency arguments raised by the majority.
Similar to its failure to address business realities, FEPA also failed
to acknowledge the Court’s rationales for its narrow interpretation in
favor of ready applicability. As an intended override of the Vance
decision, FEPA could have addressed and incorporated either the
majority’s or the dissent’s concerns. For example, it could have provided
a means through which the majority’s need for efficiency could be

111. Id.
112. Id. at 2463 (“The Court’s focus on finding a definition of supervisor capable of instant
application is at odds with the Court’s ordinary emphasis on the importance of particular circumstances in
Title VII cases. See, e.g., Burlington Northern [& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White], 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S. Ct.
2405 [2006] (‘[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular
circumstances.’); Harris [v. Forklift Sys., Inc.], 510 U.S. [17] at 23, 114 S. Ct. 367 [1993] (‘[W]hether an
environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.’)”);
see also Davis, supra note 86, at 167 (citing Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining
that the question of “whether a particular work environment is objectively hostile is necessarily a factintensive inquiry”)).
113. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Davis, supra note 86, at 167.
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carried out by a definitional standard, or explained more explicitly that
the dissent’s concerns regarding plaintiffs’ difficult procedural battle are
substantial enough to outweigh the majority’s call for simplicity. Rather
than address these concerns, the drafters reacted hastilycriticizing
118
119
Vance and reverting to the EEOC’s previous definition of supervisor.
As a result, FEPA lacks a solid, well-rounded foundation as to why the
two-prong definition of supervisor is integral to Title VII’s role in the
modern workplace.
Reviewing Vance and FEPA, each brought to light the successes and
failures in attempts to answer the question“Who is a
supervisor?”suggesting that neither offers the perfect solution. While
the Vance majority did call attention to the legitimate interests of
employers and courts, the Court seems to have forgotten the underlying
aims of Title VII in the process. Conversely, Congress sought to uphold
the aims of Title VII, but did so without regard for the challenges that
come along with such expansive employer liability. In failing to
incorporate the Court’s concerns, Congress did not facilitate courts’ and
employers’ ability to better address instances of harassment by
supervisors as they arise.
Rather than engaging in a dialogue with the Court about creating a
workable definition of supervisor, the drafters of FEPA changed the
conversation to public policy and previous interpretations. If Congress
could instead construct an approach for evaluating employer liability that
better reflects current business and judicial realities, it could pave the
way for a standard that neither leaves victims without adequate redress
nor places an unrealistic burden on employers and courts.
C. Employees’ Realities: “Between a Rock and a Hard Place”
Though Congress’ reactionary effort to override the harm caused by
the Vance decision failed, the harsh realities of harassment and abuse of
authority are stark reminders that further action needed to fully protect
employees under Title VII. Employees across industries, especially lowwage workers, find themselves “between a rock and a hard place” when
they experience harassment in the workplacechoosing between the risk
of losing their job after reporting the harassment, and the risk of
120
unsuccessfully litigating their claims under the narrow Vance standard.
Both risks are all the more threatening to low-wage workers, who are
least able to bear the costs associated with the risk of losing their
121
employment and jeopardizing their financial stability.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(11), (14) (2d Sess. 2014).
Id. § 2(b).
Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 2.
Id. at 4–5.
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Even before any of these difficult decisions are made, victims must
first make the impossible split-second decision to resist their harasser, or
give way to their harassers’ force for fear of what might happen if they do
not. One sector of employees facing these decisions far too regularly is
agricultural-field workers. According to a recent study, eighty percent of
150 female farm workers in the California Central Valley reported that
they had experienced sexual harassment, varying from unwanted
122
touching to rape. The uncertainty of what might happen next looms
large for these workers, whose fears range from not being able to provide
for their families to being deported.
The story of Maricruz Ladino is just one example of the experience
of many agricultural workers who must make the same impossible choice
123
between job stability and their physical and psychological well-being.
Ladino worked in the agricultural fields for nearly eighteen years, and
endured the troubling power dynamic of mistreatment and abuse that
124
pervades the agricultural fields. She explained:
One of the supervisors wanted me to go with him to check the crops. He
insinuated that he wanted other things with me. One day we went to do an
inspection in a field. He took the opportunity to abuse me. It happened in
a place far from other people. I couldn’t say anything. I couldn’t even
125
scream because it is very traumatic.

Despite the personal impact and pain of this experience, Ladino
hesitated to report the incident for fear of being seen by management as
126
a “troublemaker.” She explained her hesitation: “If I said anything I
would lose my job. I couldn’t lose my job because I was the one taking
127
care of my daughters.” Ladino is not alone in this battle between
advocating for one’s own safety and ensuring one’s ability to provide
128
shelter, food, and care for loved ones. No one should have to make this
choice, but where harassers continue to use their perceived or actual
authority to threaten their way out of being reported, and employers
continue to escape liability through vague employee structures and
inadequate preventative and remedial measures, victims continue to
suffer.
D. Realities in the Aftermath of VANCE
Since the Court’s decision in Vance, its narrow definition of
supervisor has already been applied to “insulat[e] employers from direct
responsibility for conduct by supervisors who lack the actual authority to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 4 nn.4243.
Id. at 4 n.48 (citing Frontline: Rape in the Fields (PBS 2013)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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129

hire and fire subordinates.” This limited avenue to vicarious liability
poses a harsh reality for many employees, including Monica Fernando, a
line cook in a fast food restaurant who was harassed and assaulted by her
130
Fernando’s supervisor could not take tangible
direct supervisor.
employment actions, but he trained her, checked her work daily, and
131
132
scheduled her shifts. “Eventually, he raped her.” Under the new
standard, Fernando’s supervisor and many like him can be “recast” as
mere coworkers despite their substantial control over their victims’
133
everyday employment.
In the aftermath of Vance, this recasting has started to take force.
For example, Megan McCafferty, a fifteen-year-old McDonald’s
employee, faced this tragic reality when the Tenth Circuit dismissed her
claim because her harasser was not authorized to take tangible
134
employment actions. After offering to drive McCafferty from school to
work, Jacob Wayne Peterson, her shift supervisor, drove her to his
friend’s house instead and informed her that she could have the day
135
off. Peterson then allegedly sexually assaulted her for the next two days
136
while “plying her with alcohol and drugs.” Applying the Vance
standard, the Tenth Circuit determined that because Peterson did not
have the authority to hire or fire employees, he did not qualify as a
137
supervisor. The court made this determination despite the reality that
Peterson was often the most senior employee on duty during
McCafferty’s shifts, participated in the manager-in-training program,
assigned duties, scheduled breaks, authorized overtime, and could send
138
employees home for misconduct or when business was slow. In
situations like the one faced by the young Megan McCafferty, Vance
unfortunately “gives cover to employers who bury their heads in the sand
139
when it comes to how their entry-level workers are treated.”
Following Vance, employers can alter their employee structures to
their benefit by strategically “concentrat[ing] hire and fire power in the
hands of a few higher-level managers while dispersing substantial daily

129. ERA Staff, What “Supervisor” (and the Fair Employment Protection Act) Means to Marginalized
Women Workers, Equal Rts. Advocates (June 24, 2014), http://www.equalrights.org/what-supervisor-andthe-fair-employment-protection-act-means-to-marginalized-women-workers/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
130. Id. At the time when this post was written, Monica Fernando was an Equal Rights Advocates
client. Her name was changed for purposes of this Article.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 14; McCafferty v. Preiss Enters., Inc., 534 F.App’x 726
(10th Cir. 2013).
135. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 14 (citation omitted).
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. Id. (citation omitted).
138. Id. (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 11; See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013).
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supervisory responsibilities among lower-level supervisors, whose
140
harassment is far less likely to lead to employer liability.” In addition,
attorneys are actively counseling corporate clients on ways to use Vance
to their advantage. For example, one firm recommended that employers
“consider strategic opportunities to capitalize on the Vance and
McCafferty decisions by limiting the scope of authority that certain leaders
possess in order to narrow the scope of [their] risk for vicarious
supervisory liability,” and “note the limitations in the updated job
descriptions . . . in establishing the leader is not a ‘supervisor’ for Title VII
141
purposes.” This recommendation is a clear indication that attorneys and
employers are not hesitating to incorporate Vance’s narrow standard into
decisions affecting their employees.
V. Proposal: A Tiered Approach to Employer Liability
With a less reactionary response to the Court’s narrow holding in
Vance, Congress could construct legislation that successfully upholds the
spirit of Title VII, but does not prompt resistance from courts and
employers. This proposal, intended as a middle ground between Vance
and FEPA, calls for a tiered approach to determining employers’ liability
based on the designation of the harasser in one of four categories,
including: (1) “tangible employment action” supervisor; (2) “apparent
authority” supervisor; (3) “day-to-day” supervisor; and (4) coworker.
These four categories would have corresponding levels of liability for the
142
employer: vicarious liability with an available affirmative defense for
categories one and two and negligence for categories three and four.
Under this tiered structure, legislation could better accommodate
workplace realities, employers’ legitimate business interests, employees’
need for genuine avenues of redress, and the judicial system’s concern
for efficiency, as discussed earlier in this Note.
This proposal represents a middle ground between Vance’s limited
vicarious liability and FEPA’s broad approach, by balancing the interests
of employers and employees (victims) in light of the case-specific
employment structure and supervisory dynamic. Where the risk of
vicarious liability is significant for employers under FEPA’s approach,
140. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 14.
141. Id. at 14, 22 n.129 (citing Christopher S. Thrutchley, The Employer’s Legal Resource: 10th
Circuit Ruling Good Win for Employers, but . . ., Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson LLP
Lawyers (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.dsda.com/News-Publications/Newsletters/25514/The-EmployersLegal-Resource-10th-Circuit-Ruling-a-Good-Win-for-Employers-but).
142. The affirmative defense available under this proposal is consistent with that which was
applied by the Court in Vance. It establishes that an affirmative defense exists where the employer can
prove “(1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior
and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities that were provided.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
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this proposal provides employers with the opportunity to escape liability
by proving an affirmative defense in categories one and two. Categories
three and four uphold the Vance majority’s view that employers should
not be held vicariously liable for the acts of “day-to-day” supervisors or
143
mere coworkers. This approach also serves the interests of victims,
particularly through category two, which recognizes situations in which
the victim’s reasonable perception of the supervisor’s authority was
strong enough to dissuade the victim from reporting harassment or
discrimination for fear of retaliation.
Where “[s]upervisors, like the workplaces they manage, come in all
shapes and sizes,” this structure would be more cognizant of modern
144
organizational structures. As the de-privatized “realm of the workplace”
continues to evolve and take on different forms, a narrow definition of
145
supervisor ignores the many scenarios in which harassment occurs.
Instead, a flexible approach will assist employees, employers, and courts in
accurately evaluating Title VII claims and determining liability. In
everyday business operations, human resource professionals could look to
this framework when updating employee policies, investigating claims,
conducting employee opinion surveys, or reevaluating current employee
structures. With categories that acknowledge the vast differences across
workplace environments, this proposal would better ensure that
instances of harassment or discrimination are evaluated by means that
are neither overly burdensome nor out of touch with the spirit of Title
VII.
Furthermore, this organized structure would address the Vance
majority’s call for ready applicability by courts and employers alike.
Prior to and during litigation, employers and employees (victims) could
look to this framework when conducting discovery or strategizing with
their respective counsel. During litigation, courts could compare the facts
of a particular case to the features of each category, placing the harasser
in the category that best fits the circumstances. With regard to analyzing
a harasser’s status and conduct, a tiered structure incorporating different
levels of supervisory authority and employer liability will reduce the
tension between judicial efficiency and comprehensive fact-finding.
Where “[c]ontext is often key,” courts need to examine the actual
146
workplace relationship between the harasser and the victim. Under this
tiered approach, courts can evaluate which category the supervisor best

143. Id. at 2455 (“The Court today strikes from the supervisory category employees who control
the day-to-day schedules and assignments of others, confining the category to those formally
empowered to take tangible employment actions.”); id. at 2439 (“If the harassing employee is the
victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.”).
144. Id. at 2463.
145. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 16263.
146. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2462.
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fits into and proceed based on that designation to evaluate employer
liability.
A. Category One: “Tangible Employment Action”
SupervisorVicarious Liability with an Affirmative Defense
In this first category and consistent with Vance, an “employee is a
‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is
empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against
147
the victim.” For this proposal, a tangible employment action retains the
definition applied in Vance: “[A] significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
148
benefits.” As a “defining characteristic” of supervisory authority, the
power to take tangible employment actions is solid ground for vicarious
liability because it is the means through which supervisors “bring[] the
149
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.” Further, this
category aptly calls for vicarious liability because it applies to a distinct
class of agents possessing the explicit authority to take employment
actions against subordinate employees, rather than an “ill-defined class
150
of employees who qualify as supervisors.”
When a harasser is deemed to fall within this first category, the
employer will be vicariously liable if the harassing supervisor (1)
ultimately takes a tangible employment action against the victim, or (2)
creates a hostile work environment for which the employer cannot
151
establish an affirmative defense. Employer liability for a harasser’s
tangible employment action against the victim is justified because such
an action is likely to require a company act and to have been
152
documented by higher management. Even if the supervisor has not yet
taken a tangible employment action, the employer should be liable for
the creation of a hostile work environment because a supervisor’s vested
power to take such an action injects a certain “threatening character”
153
into her conduct. However, it is sometimes unfair or unreasonable to rest
ultimate liability with the employer. If the employer can successfully show
an affirmative defense “(1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities that were provided,” then the employer may avoid vicarious

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 2439.
Id. at 2456 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2448 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2441–42.
Id. at 2442.
Id.
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liability. Otherwise, harassment by a “tangible employment action”
supervisor will result in vicarious liability for the employer.
B. Category Two: “Apparent Authority” SupervisorVicarious
Liability with an Affirmative Defense
In this second category of the tiered structure, a supervisor is
defined as an employee with the apparent authority to take tangible
employment actions against his or her victim. For the purposes of this
category, apparent authority is defined as “the power held by an agent or
other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a
third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the
155
principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” As
applied in the context of workplace harassment, this standard of apparent
authority means: “the power held by [the harasser] to affect [an employer’s]
legal relations with [the victim] when [the victim] reasonably believes [the
harasser] has authority to act on behalf of [the employer] and that belief is
156
traceable to [the employer’s] manifestations.” In effect, this category
would account for claims by victims whom we could imagine saying, “If I
think my harasser can fire me, that will affect me in the same way as if my
harasser can actually fire me” or, “If my employer is going to allow me to
157
think that my harasser can fire me, then it should be liable.” Under this
standard, employers would be vicariously liable for the harassment
committed by employees who have apparent authority to take tangible
employment actions. However, they would retain the same opportunity
to prove the affirmative defense as employers possess under category
158
one.
Both the EEOC and the courts have contemplated vicarious liability
159
for harassment by employees with apparent authority. The EEOC
discussed such liability in circumstances where “the chains of command
are unclear” or “the employee might reasonably believe that a harasser
with broad delegated powers has the ability to significantly influence
employment decisions affecting him or her even if the harasser is outside
160
the employee’s chain of command.” Courts have also recognized that
154. Id. (citation omitted); see supra note 142 (discussing the affirmative defense as provided in Vance).
155. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (2006).
156. Id.
157. With respect to what “[the] employer is going to allow [the] victim to think,” “manifestations”
under the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 should also include omissions because there is also a
likelihood that an employer’s failure to inform the victim of other employees’ designated roles and
responsibilities could cause the victim to endure the harassment for fear of retaliation by the harasser.
158. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 (2013).
159. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer
Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Order 205.001, Appendix B,
Attachment 4 § a(5) (June 18, 1999), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [hereinafter
EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
160. Id.
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in certain circumstances, apparent authority is an acceptable avenue for
161
applying vicarious liability. These acknowledgements suggest that
apparent authority is a cognizable and powerful force in certain
employment structures and should be addressed accordingly.
Within this category, the victim’s claim will rely heavily on a casespecific factual inquiry, which is of crucial importance in workplace
162
discrimination cases. To obtain a comprehensive understanding of the
employment dynamic leading to the harassment, this inquiry would call
for extensive, yet targeted, discovery. Examination of the following
would shed light on employment operations and standards: Testimony
(from the victim, the harasser, similarly-situated coworkers, members of
higher management, etc.); formal job titles and descriptions; employment
policies and handbooks; employee training materials on harassment in
the workplace; and documentation from any complaints or reports
regarding the alleged harassment. This list of relevant evidentiary
materials would assist employers, attorneys, and courts in incorporating
this category of liability into a workable standard.
Access to such an extensive list of sources is important to this
inquiry because, as asserted by Justice Ginsburg, a determination of
supervisor status requires an examination of the specific facts of the
workplace relationship, not merely the titles or job descriptions of the
163
employees. For employers, awareness of this standard would encourage
transparency in the workplace, prompting employers to draw clear lines
between levels of employees in order to avoid liability for the actions of
apparent authority supervisors (where it was reasonable for the victim to
believe that the harasser could take tangible employment action against
him or her). Even though this inquiry is time-intensive and fact-specific,
courts partial to business interests may nevertheless accept this category,
recognizing these evidentiary sources as opportunities for employers to
mitigate the risk of vicarious liability. During trial, this list would provide
specific items for attorneys, judges, and jurors to consider when
determining whether the harasser had a sufficient level of apparent
authority to take “tangible employment actions.” As a result, courts will
be able to evaluate the evidence and arguments for and against a finding
of apparent authority with increased clarity, and subsequently dismiss
claims that do not satisfy this standard. Given these considerations, this

161. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (“If, in the unusual case, it is alleged there
is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was not, the victim’s mistaken
conclusion must be a reasonable one.”); see also Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236,
1247 n.20 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Although the employer may argue that the employee had no actual
authority to take the employment action against the plaintiff, apparent authority serves just as well to
impute liability to the employer for the employee’s action.”).
162. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2454.
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more extensive factual and evidentiary inquiry would benefit employers,
victims, and courts in their mutual interest to achieve efficiency.
The “apparent authority” supervisor is a justifiable addition to the
employer liability scheme under Vance. Though this category is not as
limited as the Court’s narrow definition in Vance, it still comports with
the Court’s emphasis on needing something more than the ability to
164
direct another’s tasks for a finding of vicarious liability. In this context,
an alleged supervisor’s apparent authority provides the something more
that the majority sought. To illustrate, if the employer has not clearly
drawn the lines of an employee’s authority, then the harasser in a
perceived supervisory capacity is no less empowered by that apparent
authority when harassing others. As demonstrated by this illustration and
the justifications provided below, the apparent authority supervisor
would be an important addition to the Title VII framework because it
calls attention to certain undeniable realities of the modern workplace.
A further point in favor of vicarious liability is that the threat of
such liability incentivizes employers to conduct preventative trainings
165
about workplace harassment. Under Vance, the goals of vicarious
liability, including redress for employees, would only be carried out to
the extent that they apply to “tangible employment action”
supervisorsexcluding those who do not have such authority but do
control the work activities and schedules of other employees, like
166
Monica Fernando discussed above in Part IV.D. In comparison, under
this category of extended vicarious liability, employers would be
incentivized to prevent and guard against misconduct by screening,
167
Where
training, and monitoring a broader range of employees.
vicarious liability is recognized as a “cost of doing business,” employers
should take responsibility, especially where that cost arises from an
employer’s own failure to both inform potential victims of their rights
and obligations in the face of harassment, and develop a structure in
168
which employees cannot abuse their actual or apparent authority.
Given that the Court’s narrow definition of supervisor in Vance has
substantially minimized the possibility of vicarious liability, this apparent
authority category would be of significant benefit to future victims of
169
workplace harassment. Under Vance, if a victim cannot prove that her
harasser possessed “tangible employment action” authority, she is left with
164. Id. at 2448.
165. Davis, supra note 86, at 168.
166. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2464–65.
167. Id. at 2464 (citation omitted).
168. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) (“An employer can, in a general sense,
reasonably anticipate the possibility of such conduct occurring in its workplace, and one might justify the
assignment of the burden of the untoward behavior to the employer as one of the costs of doing business,
to be charged to the enterprise rather than the victim.”).
169. Davis, supra note 86, at 167.
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only a negligence claim, which requires her to prove “that the employer
170
knew or should have known” about the harasser’s misconduct. The task
of proving employer negligence is difficult for victims because specific
evidence of negligence can be difficult to discover and “[an] employer’s
171
failure to adopt a precaution might lurk in the background.” Where
“[a]nyone engaged in the practice of law knows that negligence causes of
action are generally more difficult to prove than strict and vicarious
liability cases,” extending vicarious liability to harassers with apparent
172
authority will help preserve victims’ opportunities for redress.
The workplace environment itself provides further justification for
the inclusion of an “apparent authority” supervisor within the scheme of
vicarious liability. It has been said that “‘the man in the street’ thinks of a
corporation with its officers and employees as an identifiable unity, as in
173
‘[t]hey ought to pay.’” In this context, employers “ought to pay” when
a victim reasonably believes there is an “identifiable unity” between the
employer and the harasser. Power dynamics and deference to authority
further support the notion of apparent authority, especially where
employers have not educated employees on proper workplace
interactions and hierarchies. Professor Martha Chamallas discussed such
deference in terms of “children and other vulnerable populations . . .
expected to defer to authority figures [such as] police, guards, teachers,
174
coaches, or doctors.” This concept can be applied to the workplace,
where vulnerable groups, including women, minorities, and subordinate
employees experience “a special risk that . . . deference will facilitate
175
abuse.” Where a supervisor is able to take tangible employment actions
against her victim, the victim will likely defer to such authority and
refrain from reporting for fear of retaliation. Extending this analogy
further, a harasser with apparent authority to take such actions will
receive the same level of deference and complacency from her victim as
one with the explicit authority to do so.
Relatedly, a harasser’s ability to threaten “to alter a subordinate’s
terms or conditions of employment” further justifies the application of
176
vicarious liability in the apparent authority context. From the victim’s
reasonable perspective, whether the harasser actually or apparently has
such authority over subordinates arguably “hangs as a threat over the
177
victim” in the same way. The comparison of harassment by coworkers
as opposed to supervisors, as discussed by Justice Ginsburg, can also
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Chamallas, supra note 3, at 153 (citation omitted).
Davis, supra note 86, at 167.
Chamallas, supra note 3, at 134–35 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 171–72.
Id.
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2013).
Id.
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apply to harassment by those with apparent supervisory authority. If
harassed by a coworker, a victim can more easily walk away or tell the
179
harasser to “buzz off.” In comparison, when the harasser has any
authority, actual or apparent, to take some action against the victim, the
victim will likely be reluctant to report, halted by the (actual or
perceived) risk of an undesirable, unsafe, or disruptive assignment,
180
transfer, workload, shift, demotion, or firing.
In addition, enterprise risk and institutional liability also support the
application of vicarious liability to this category because “in the modern
world, injuries [including harassment] are the ‘inevitable by-products of
181
planned activities’” in the enterprise of the workplace. As Professor
Chamallas discussed, “[a]n enterprise ‘fully causes’ the wrong of an
employee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent
unemployment of the employee would reduce the probability of the wrong
182
to zero.” Then, “even if an employee’s tort is personally motivated, it is
efficient to impose vicarious liability on the employer if the tort was
183
caused at least in part by the employment relationship.” Similarly,
institutional liability recognizes the employer’s causal role in the creation
184
or facilitation of the harm. As it would relate to apparent authority, this
causation arises where the employer has not sufficiently informed its
employees (potential victims) that they need not fear retaliation or worry
that a tangible employment action may result in the aftermath of
harassment. Where an employer has allowed supervisor-like employees
to proceed with apparent authority that they can abuse in harassing
185
others, the “systemic nature of the problem” becomes evident. These
notions of enterprise risk and institutional liability arguably apply to the
harassment cases discussed throughout this Note.
The purpose of this category is to reach a middle ground between
Vance and FEPA’s definitions of supervisor, extending vicarious liability
further than Vance, but not too far. The Court has deemed vicarious
liability to be justified where the employer is responsible for granting the
tangible employment action that a harasser ultimately misuses against
186
Conversely, the Court has recognized that a fellow
her victim.
employee’s mere “ability to direct” another’s day-to-day activities does
187
not give rise to the same level of liability for employers. As applied, the

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 2456.
Id.
Id.
Chamallas, supra note 3, at 156–57.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Davis, supra note 86, at 166.
Id.
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use of apparent authority makes the line drawing between “tangible
employment action” and “control of day-to-day activities” more
favorable for victims and more acceptable to those seeking to uphold the
spirit of Title VII. This is because the category would capture workplace
scenarios where an employer has not officially granted this authority, but
also has not satisfactorily informed employees of the true hierarchy of
authority. When employers fail to inform of such a hierarchy, they have
created a scenario in which one employee can abuse the victim’s
perception of his or her authority, and the victim, reasonably believing in
that authority, does not report the harassment for fear of an employment
action against himself or herself.
This category would likely extend vicarious liability to cases that fell
outside the Vance definition but were highlighted by the dissent. In these
cases, “[e]ach man’s discriminatory harassment derived force from, and
188
was facilitated by, the control reins he held.” As Justice Ginsburg
appropriately noted, “[u]nder any fair reading of Title VII, in each of the
illustrative cases, the superior employee should have been classified a
189
supervisor whose conduct would trigger vicarious liability.” Two of
these cases involved facts that arguably fit within the features of this
190
category. First is the story of Clara Whitten, whose manager told her
on her first day of work that if she wanted approval for time off she had
191
to “give [him] what [he] wanted.” After Whitten refused to meet the
manager in an isolated storeroom, he reacted by doing the following:
denying her the requested time off; instructing her to stay late and clean
192
the store; and threatening to make her life a “living hell.” Though the
manager did not have the authority to take tangible employment actions,
193
he was able to control her day-to-day work activities. Where the
manager was often the highest-ranking employee in the store and both
Whitten and the manager thought of him as her supervisor, it is clear that
194
the manager used this apparent authority strategically. Considering
that the manager made the initial demand to “give [him] what [he]
wanted” on Whitten’s first day of work, it is evident that he took
advantage of some level of perceived authority from the start.
195
Second is the story of Monika Starke, a newly hired truck driver,
who was to be paired with “lead drivers” for the duration of a twenty-

188. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2460 (2013).
189. Id.
190. Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Vance v. Ball State Univ.,
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
191. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2459.
192. Id. at 2459–60.
193. Id. at 2460.
194. Id.
195. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012).
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eight-day on-the-road training trip. These lead drivers did not have the
authority to take tangible employment actions but did control activities
during the trip (such as assigning tasks and scheduling rest stops) and,
more importantly, were charged with “evaluat[ing] trainees’ performance
with a nonbinding pass or fail recommendation that could lead to full
197
driver status.” Two lead drivers harassed Starke during the duration of
198
199
her training. The first “filled the cabin with vulgar sexual remarks.”
The second “forced her into unwanted sex with him, an outrage to which
200
she submitted, believing it necessary to gain a passing grade.” Based on
Starke’s belief that giving way to the driver’s force was necessary to pass
her training, the employer arguably afforded these drivers with at least
some level of apparent authority given their role in deciding whether or
not trainees passed. Focusing less on the reasonableness of Starke’s
belief and more on the training drivers’ actions, this situation, like Clara
Whitten’s, arose when the victim was new to the employer and unaware
of other employees’ level of authority over her. If courts were to accept
this apparent authority category, employers would follow suittraining
and educating their employees more effectively in order to mitigate the
risk of vicarious liability.
This category of apparent authority brings with it further benefits
for both employees and employers. For employees, vicarious liability
“saves the cost of investigating the existence of the untaken precaution
201
and then litigating the negligence issue.” It would also “do a better job
than a negligence regime in achieving . . . [the] goal of encouraging the
202
employer’s cost-justified risk-reducing measures.” If such risk-reduced
measures are then implemented, there will ideally be fewer instances of
harassment in the workplace. Professor Chamallas echoed this point,
explaining that vicarious liability encourages employers to be creative in
203
their search for ways to make the workplace safer. For employers, this
category suggests manageable steps to avoid vicarious liability. In
developing a clear employee structure and training employees on the
dynamics of that structure (such as who does and does not have “tangible
employment action” authority over them), employers can mitigate the
risk that a victim will successfully prove an apparent authority claim. In
turn, this category then provides an additional benefit to better-informed

196. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2460; see Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 13–14, for a discussion of
several similarly disturbing stories about female CRST Van Expedited, Inc. employees, who, like
Monica Starke, were harassed and assaulted by lead drivers during their training trips.
197. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2460.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 153.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 152.
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employees by empowering them to report instances of harassment
without fear of “tangible employment action” retaliation.
In conjunction with such efforts to better structure and train
employees, employers could further protect themselves from liability
through increased use of indemnification. In application, indemnification
would allow employers to avoid liability for the full extent of the harm
204
caused by the harasser. If employers were to exercise indemnity rights
more regularly, vicarious liability could deter employees, informed of the
205
indemnification policy, from engaging in harassment. Exercising these
rights would benefit employers where “it would seem that employers
would want to distance themselves from the offending employee as much
206
as possible.” Even though vicarious liability poses a greater risk to
employers, it also provides them with an incentive to avoid liability.
Conversely, the narrow definition provided by Vance will not only
undercut initiatives to prevent harassment in the workplace, but will also
lead to “imprudence by employers [that] will ultimately make them more
207
vulnerable to harassment claims.”
C. Category Three: “Day to Day” SupervisorNegligence
Arising from Breach of a Duty to Act
Given the range of employee interactions that may lead to harassment
in the workplace, the Court in Vance asserted that “[n]egligence provides
the better framework for evaluating an employer’s liability when a harassing
208
employee lacks the power to take tangible employment actions.” Through
its narrow definition of supervisor, the Court broadened the scope of claims
that will be reviewed under a negligence standard. For those viewing this
more frequent escape from vicarious liability as problematic, the application
of a truer negligence standard and a “duty to act” standard, which focuses
on more tangible instances of employer negligence, would address concerns
associated with lesser liability under negligence.
209
While there is no general duty to act in tort law, such a duty may
210
arise in light of certain exceptions. Analogizing to tort law, there are
204. Id. at 154.
205. Id. at 153–54.
206. Id. at 154.
207. Davis, supra note 86, at 168.
208. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2448 (2013).
209. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes or should
realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action.”); see id. § 315 (“There is no duty so to control the conduct of a
third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation
exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third
person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.”).
210. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. a (1965) (“The actor may have control of a third
person, or of land or chattels, and be under a duty to exercise such control, as stated in §§ 316–20.”);
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certain circumstances in which employers should have a duty to take
specific reasonable actions, such as the scenario in which day-to-day
supervisors can significantly harm employees by way of harassment and
retaliatory action. One such exception, section 317 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, provides:
211

A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his
212
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting
himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if . . .
the servant . . is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon
which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or . . . is
using a chattel of the master, and . . . the master . . . knows or has
reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and . . .
knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
213
such control.

This duty, hereinafter referred to as the “section 317 duty,” arises
where an employee is acting outside the scope of her employment and
either intentionally causes harm to others or creates an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm, and can be readily applied to this context. Given the high
unlikelihood that the scope of one’s employment would include
discrimination or harassment, mistreating another employee in this way
would fall outside the scope of one’s employment. Where harassment
often involves the use of derogatory language, retaliatory actions, or
other detrimental acts, the harasser’s harm is likely to have been
intentional. Extending the risk of bodily harm to include psychological or
emotional harm, this breach of duty would cover workplace scenarios
where the harasser is creating a hostile environment in which other
employees (victims or others) are afraid to speak up for fear of their
well-being, or report to higher management.
In most employment structures, the very nature of an employment
relationship would satisfy section 317(a)(i)–(ii) because the employee is
either on the premises owned by, or using the instrumentalities of, her
employer. The employer’s awareness of the ability to control the
harassing employee, required by section 317(b)(i), arises from the
employer’s ability to take certain actions (such as tangible employment
actions) against an employee for improper conduct. A more challenging

id. § 314 cmt. c. (1965) (“The relations between the actor and a third person which require the actor to
control the third person’s conduct are stated in §§ 316–19.”).
211. “Master” meaning “employer;” “Servant” meaning “employee.” See Restatement (Third) of
Agency § 2.04 cmt. a (2006) (“This Restatement does not use the terminology of ‘master’ and
‘servant.’”).
212. Id. § 7.07(2) (“An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work
assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer’s control. An
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of
conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”).
213. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965).
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factor for victims to prove might be the employer’s knowledge of the
necessity and opportunity for control under section 317(b)(ii) given that
the employer may be entirely unaware of the harassment. However,
there is nonetheless a strong basis for the use of a section 317 analogy for
proving employer negligence under Title VII.
Application of this third category is further warranted because it
would provide victims with the opportunity to prove negligence that is
specific to their employers’ failure to prevent employees with day-to-day
control from harassing others. For purposes of this category,
“supervisor” would be defined as “an individual with the authority to
214
direct the victim’s daily work activities,” excluding those whom the
plaintiff has successfully proven to fall within the “apparent authority”
category. Under this category, a duty to act would be reasonable because
a special relationship akin to section 317 exists where the employer has
made a day-to-day supervisor a proxy for itself. Where higher
management cannot be physically present at every worksite or in every
store location, the employer selects certain employees to manage the
215
day-to-day operations of a particular workplace. Having empowered
their employees with this authority, employers should be expected to
fulfill their section 317 duty by creating a system through which
harassment in the workplace can be better prevented or reported.
Furthermore, this section 317 duty would require employers to train
employees at all levels on matters including: their rights and obligations
under existing workplace harassment laws; how to navigate the
established reporting channels; and importantly, the company’s
employment structure and chain of authority. Accordingly, the
determination of an employer’s breach would be based on factors
including the system of training and reporting it has in place, or should
have, created. This connection between “day-to-day” supervisors and an
employer’s duty under the circumstances of the system created is
important because acts of harassment by lower-level supervisors could be
better prevented or reported if employees (potential victims) were better
informed.
Several scenarios highlight the need for a category between mere
coworkers and supervisors with actual or apparent authority to take
“tangible employment actions.” One example is a scenario in which
“[m]embers of a team may each have the responsibility for taking the
lead with respect to a particular aspect of the work and thus, may have
216
the responsibility to direct each other in that area of responsibility.”
Though this example falls outside of the scope of both category one (that
is, the Vance Court’s narrow holding) and category two (apparent
214. Fair Employment Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 4227, 113th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2d Sess. 2014).
215. See supra text accompanying note 94. Goss Graves et al., supra note 93, at 9.
216. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S Ct. 2434, 2452.
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authority), the ability to direct another’s work still contains a level of
control that a harasser may abuse. It is not difficult to imagine, for
example, a scenario in which an employee might be left “unprotected
against harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict
psychological injury by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work
217
environment in objectionable ways.” Though Justice Alito asserted
that a victim in such a situation could “simply” show negligence, it is not
so simple for a victim to succeed on a negligence claim, as discussed
218
earlier in Part IV.B of this Note.
Even with the recognized difficulty in proving a negligence claim,
the prominence of the negligence standard and the need for judicial
efficiency suggest that this standard of proof does have a place in the
scheme of liability for workplace harassment. In Vance, Justice Alito
stated that, “[t]here is no reason why this [negligence] standard, if
accompanied by proper instructions, cannot provide the same service in
the context at issue here” as it provides to “tort plaintiffs in many other
219
situations.” This category has the potential to fill this need for “proper
instructions.”
With breach so closely tied to employee training and transparency,
this category would benefit employers, informing them of the avenues
through which they might escape liability even under a negligence
standard. Employers could act on this duty by clarifying the channels for
reporting and providing information regarding employee hierarchy. As a
result, employers could mitigate their own risks for breaching this duty
while simultaneously supporting employees’ ability to navigate this
system and obtain redress for harm suffered.
D. Category Four: CoworkerNegligence
The fourth category would encompass all coworkers who do not have
any actual or apparent authority to take tangible employment actions or to
control the victim’s day-to-day activities. Even pro-employee authorities
like the EEOC have accepted and applied a negligence standard to
220
instances of harassment or discrimination by coworkers. For this
category, “a plaintiff [may] still prevail by showing that his or her employer
was negligent in failing to prevent harassment [by a non-supervisor] from
217. Id. at 2451.
218. Id. at 2438.
219. Id. at 2452.
220. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 159, at I (“The Commission’s long-standing
guidance on employer liability for harassment by co-workers remains in effectan employer is liable
if it knew or should have known of the misconduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (“With respect to conduct between
fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless
it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.”).
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taking place.” A plaintiff would be able to prove negligence by pointing
to her employer’s failure to “monitor the workplace, . . . respond to
complaints, [or] . . . provide a system for registering complaints” or an
222
employer’s “effective[] discourage[ment]” of complaint-filing.
In practice, this fourth category would apply where it would not be
reasonable for the victim to believe that the harasser possessed any
supervisory power or control. In this scenario, a coworker “can inflict
‘psychological injuries’ by creating a hostile work environment, but []
‘cannot dock another’s pay, nor . . . demote another.’” Under such
circumstances, vicarious liability is improper because it would be too
difficult for employers to monitor the actions of all employees working as
223
coworkers. For this reason, negligence is more appropriate because it
imposes liability where “the employer knew or should have known about
224
the conduct and failed to address it.”
Conclusion
Recognizing that the aims of Title VII are not guaranteed to fare
well following a congressional override, Congress must approach any
opportunity for an override with careful consideration of the concerns
expressed by the actors involvedemployers, employees, and courts. As
it relates to the issue of employer liability, a tiered structure that reflects
modern business as well as judicial and structural realities has the
potential to reach a middle ground, acceptable to both pro-employer and
pro-employee constituents. Resisting premature reactions and drafting
more comprehensive legislative responses, Congress could pave the way
for lasting progress and preserve the protective aims of Title VII by
facilitating the simplicity sought by courts and acknowledging the
complex realities of the modern-day workplace.

221.
222.
223.
224.

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2453.
Id.
Id. at 2448 (citation omitted).
Fisk, supra note 7, at 1406.

